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

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

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
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AN

OUTLINE OF MORAL SCIENCE,

FOR

STUDENTS AND REFLECTING MEN,

BY

JOHN H. STINSON.

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PREFACE.

MORAL science is yet in its infancy. It has not at all kept pace with the progress in other branches of learning. And though many learned and ingenious authors have appeared, many of its elementary principles are as yet in doubt. To obtain a knowledge of truth has been my object in investigating for myself. Hoping to throw some light into the minds of my fellow men, I offer this little outline to be investigated by the public. If what I have written be true, it appears to me mankind will be benefitted by perusing it. If, however, it should be found that I have fallen into error, it will not, I hope, excite prejudice in the minds of men against others who may be more successful in bringing into clear view the truths of this most noble science. Time and the candid examination of intelligent minds will test it.

THE AUTHOR.

NEW YORK CITY, JUNE 1, 1860.

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OUTLINE OF MORAL SCIENCE.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

ETHICS.

MORAL Philosophy is that science, whose object is to explain the laws of the human mind, so far as morality depends upon them ; and to seek after and illustrate the will of Deity respecting human actions.

Every law is an expression of the will of an intelligence. "Municipal law is a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power in a state," *i. e.* it expresses the will of the legislature ; physical law is an expression of the will of Deity respecting matter ; mental law is an expression of the will of Providence respecting the condition and operation of the mind ; and moral law is an expression of the will of God respecting the actions of created intelligences.

Now if we take a view of mankind, and compare him with other animate beings, with which we are

familiar, we will perceive that, he not only surpasses other animals in intellectual strength, but that, he differs widely from them in other respects.

Man is everywhere a worshiper ; a being who has notions of right and wrong, and of justice, and who lays down certain principles for himself and follows them ; not because he is unavoidably compelled to do so, nor because, in this world, it is always his interest, but because he says, It is right, and I ought to do it. Men have been brought to the stake, and asked to renounce certain principles which they had adopted, but they said, We cannot retract, we prefer to suffer torture.

Now to explain the laws of mind, upon which these phenomena depend, is our object in the first part of this work.

In moral science, it is taken for granted that, there is an intelligent author of the universe, and that, all things were created by design. And hence, when we discover that, each particle of matter attracts and is attracted by every other particle, we know that, this law of the material universe was established by the will of Deity. And when two balls of matter are made to impinge against each other, action and reaction being found equal and in opposite directions, we learn another law of matter established by the Deity. And all the laws in physics are but exhibitions of the will of the Creator respecting matter.

In mental philosophy also, we are made acquainted

with certain laws, which show us the will of the Creator respecting our mental constitutions. We see, how the judgment compares ideas and traces consequences ; how the memory, recalls ideas for reflection, and how the imagination pictures to us scenes, from which we are far removed. These things are but expressions of the will of Deity respecting the mind. And in every department of science, wherever there is knowledge, we may perceive the will of the Creator.

Now, in physics, we see that, all matter invariably obeys the laws of which it is the subject, *i. e.* from necessity conforms to the will of the Creator. Beasts, also, instinctively lead that mode of life which the Creator intended for them. But man is a creature capable of conceiving and executing a great variety of actions. And it is evidently the will of Deity that man should not execute every action of which his mind may conceive. For instance, it was evidently the will of Deity that, man should live in the world and increase in number. Were it not so, He would not have made male and female, and placed them on the earth. Had the progenitors of our race, therefore, committed suicide, we cannot doubt that they would have acted contrary to the Creator's will. To seek after and illustrate the will of Deity respecting human actions, is our object in the second part of this work.

CHAPTER II.

IDEA OF THE EXISTENCE OF DEITY.

THE idea of the existence of Deity is very ancient among men. If we receive the Mosaic account of creation, our first parents had it. Or, laying aside the account by Moses, and supposing this idea to be innate, we may then be assured that each individual has had it, and that the first man possessed it. But if we suppose, with Mr. Locke, that man has no innate ideas, (and this opinion is well established among metaphysicians,) it is still evident that, the idea of the existence of Deity was among men anterior to the fabled existence of any of the gods of the ancients. For, the ancients either originally received this idea from those gods, or they had it before those gods were heard of among them. If we adopt the latter hypothesis, then this idea was more ancient than the progenitors of Jupiter. But if the former supposition be received, then we must admit that, those mythological gods had a real existence. For, a man cannot receive the idea of the existence of a chess-board from a chess-board, if there really did no chess-board exist. Neither could the ancients originally have received the idea of divinity from any one of those fabulous deities, when there really was no such divinity in existence. There-

fore, men must have originally derived the idea of Deity from some other source than the existence of fabulous gods, and consequently this idea is more ancient than the existence of such gods in the minds of men.

Now, the history of the world testifies that every nation and tribe, whose mind has been in any degree above the brute, have had the idea of the existence of Deity. And taking it for granted that this idea is not innate, it may be interesting to inquire, very briefly, in what way mankind first obtained it. If we receive the Mosaic account, God made himself known to Adam; and hence this idea might have been traditionary among his children.

Again: God talked with Noah, commanding him to build an ark. And certainly, a matter of so great importance and interest would be frequently spoken of by Noah, and again by his children. But in a very few generations from Noah, we find that the majority of the world's inhabitants had lost the true idea of the Deity's character, and worshiped the sun, moon, and imaginary gods. This, perhaps, may be accounted for from the fact that traditionary ideas of character might easily be lost by people depending entirely upon memory for their perpetuity. The truths of mathematics and philosophy, if lost, may be again discovered by man's ingenuity; but traditionary facts, if once lost, are gone forever, unless nature furnish the data from which *a posteriori* reasoning may be able to lead

us back to them. And in those days when science had not yet shed her light in the mind, men could not read the book of nature and from it discover the character of nature's author.

But traditionary ideas of the existence of Deity would not be so easily lost. For, man has an emotional nature, and he is surrounded in the world by many things which call forth these emotions. And if the traditionary idea of the existence of Deity were once among men, the phenomena of nature would be continually calling it up in the mind, and causing them to speak of it.

Again: Following the Bible account, the Deity has had direct communication with various prophets, who have not only taught the people his existence and character, but have also made known many of his designs. And that the Deity should thus reveal himself to man, has been received as probable by the world's inhabitants. For, almost every people on earth have had prophets, and by them received genuine or suppositious revelations. But again: If we believe with many of the ancients, that man appeared upon the earth, at the first, a mute animal, without any knowledge of his origin or destiny, and by gradually progressing he attained to all the knowledge which he now possesses, the following hypotheses may be worthy of consideration.

Socrates endeavored to prove to Aristodemus the existence of a Creator from the marks of design ex-

hibited in creation. This argument from design had been thought of before the time of Socrates, and in recent times it has been clearly and fully illustrated by Paley. And it is possible that mankind might have thus derived the idea of the Deity's existence. In all nature we perceive the finest mechanism; one thing made with an exact adaptation to another.

But it is evident, that before this argument was discovered or appreciated, men must have had considerable intellectual cultivation; while the idea of Deity's existence, most probably, commenced in a very rude and ignorant age. And even though a few master-minds should have obtained this idea, it is not very probable that the mass of mankind could have been made to appreciate the argument, or to believe the philosophers.

But again; in this world, men frequently see their best laid plans frustrated, their expectations blasted, and their brightest hopes extinguished. And in the history of the dead and among the living, we find many men attributing their misfortunes to inexorable fate. In such a mood of mind it might be natural for men to suppose that there was a superior intelligence operating against them.

But again; if we study human nature we will find that it is the constitutional bent of man to attribute animation to natural phenomena, which are not understood, and which appear strange and exciting. The ancient Greeks supposed the electricity excited in

amber to be animation ; and this tendency of mind may be noticed in all ignorant nations. And as we go back in the world's history, we find that the farther we go back the stronger were the emotions raised in men's minds by natural objects. This may be learned by a perusal of the writings of the ancients, which have come down to us. The minds of the ancient Hebrew and Greek poets were undoubtedly impressed more strongly than the most sensitive intellect of later times.

For, in their writings we find the greatest number of instances, and the finest specimens of the sublime. And in those ancient days before science had explained the causes of things, men must have been continually excited in the highest degree. Eclipses of the sun and moon, hurricanes, thunder and lightning, earthquakes, etc., must have terribly excited them. And in such cases, nothing could be more natural than to suppose these phenomena to be animated beings possessed of superior intelligence and power. And so far as we can learn from profane history, the most ancient worship was that of natural phenomena, to wit, of the sun and moon. And when knowledge had increased, it would be a natural and easy transition of mind, to suppose these phenomena to be merely agents of the will of a ruling intelligence. For our purpose, however, it matters not in what manner men obtained the idea of Deity's existence. All we need is, that his existence be admitted, and that the idea of a divine existence be among men.

CHAPTER III.

HUMAN ACTION.

HUMAN action is an effect produced by the exertion of man. And as all exertion which man can put forth originates in the mind, let us examine the mind so far as may be necessary to understand in what manner actions are brought about.

The mind has two capacities ; the one active and the other passive. In its passive capacity, it receives impressions ; and these impressions produce effects, according to the laws which the Deity has established. Thus : if rays of light reflected from an object, enter the eye and form an image upon the retina, and the optic nerve be perfect, the mind receives an impression ; and the effect produced by this impression is the consequent ideas of form or color. And if any sensation whatever affect the body, the mind in its passive capacity receives the impression, and a consequent effect is the result. Again ; the mind in its passive capacity receives impressions from mere ideas, and the legitimate effects follow. Thus : by listening to a witty discourse we are made merry, and by reading a pathetic tale we become sad. Let us next point out a few things concerning the active capacity of the mind. And first—of conception. By conception we mean that

power which the mind possesses of viewing actions, circumstances, relations, etc., in idea. Thus: if a man desire to fell a tree, the mind has the power of viewing that action in idea, before it has been accomplished.

Second—of the judgment. The power of judgment is exercised in two ways. After the mind has a conception of a color, a solid, grass, tree, etc., it has the power of telling whether any two of these things agree or disagree. Again; from certain known laws, the mind has the power of telling what consequent will follow a given antecedent. Thus: a man who sets fire to a barn, can easily foretell, from the known laws of combustion, its consequent destruction.

Third—of the will. When a man has a conception of an action, the mind has the power of determining to do, or to refrain from it. And this power of the mind is called the will. These remarks, I apprehend, will be sufficient to enable us to trace all human actions from their origin in the mind of the actor to their final accomplishment.

Now, human actions, with reference to the mind of the actor, may be divided into three classes, viz: intentional, accidental and experimental actions. And First—of intentional actions. First, a conception of a given action must be formed in the mind of the actor; second, the will must be determined to accomplish it; then, a sufficient knowledge of the nature of things to adopt those means whose inherent qualities,

if properly directed, will accomplish the will's determination; and sufficient skill in directing these qualities must be possessed, or the action cannot be brought about. Thus: if a person propose to shoot a deer, a rifle, gunpowder and lead, are his means. Of the nature of these he must have sufficient knowledge, and he must also have sufficient skill in directing them.

Now, the knowledge of the nature of things, is gained by reflecting upon the impressions received by the mind in its passive capacity, *i. e.*, by experience.

Skill, is the making things square with sound judgment. And the squaring by the judgment constitutes *intention*, *i. e.*, the adapting means to accomplish an end; as, I am cutting timber with the *intention* of building a house.

Now, whenever an intentional action has been accomplished, the knowledge of the nature of things has previously been obtained. Hence, the conception, the determination of the will, and the *intention*, bring about all intentional actions.

Second—of accidental actions. These are brought about by a man's aiming to produce an intentional action; but from ignorance of the nature of the means employed, from unskillfulness in directing the means, or from the unperceived intervention of some object, an effect is produced different from the one designed. Thus: if a man aim a rifle at a deer, but by the ball's touching a tree, it glances and kills a person; this is a case of the unperceived intervention of

an object. Again ; if a physician endeavor to restore a sick man to health, but through ignorance of the disease, or of the properties of the medicines, he administers that which will have a contrary effect ; this is a case of the ignorance of the means. We need not illustrate further.

Third—of experimental actions. And these are brought about when a man puts forth exertion to accomplish an intentional action, which he designs to be an antecedent to some consequent one, of which, as yet, he has no conception. The effects produced by experiments in chemistry are actions of this kind, to the first discoverer. Thus : an experimenter may put together two or more different gases to see what will be the result. Now, he has already obtained the gases ; and the putting them together is an action which he understands ; and he accomplishes this intentional action, designing it as an antecedent to some consequent effect, with which he desires to become acquainted.

Having said this much concerning actions, with reference to the mind of the actor, let us now consider them with reference to the objects upon which they are produced.

Now, with reference to the objects, actions may be divided into two classes, viz : effects produced upon mind, and upon matter. And when any effect is to be produced upon mind or matter, it must obviously be brought about in conformity to fixed laws. The

laws of mind are treated of in works upon mental philosophy ; those of matter in works upon physics. These laws of mind and of matter are understood to some extent by the unlettered. At the present state of science they are not fully understood by any body.

But, I apprehend that every person's observation will have made him sufficiently acquainted with these laws, to understand the manner in which actions are brought about upon objects.

Let us, first, examine in what manner a man may produce effects—actions, upon his own mind ; second, how he may produce actions upon the minds of others ; and third, in what manner actions upon matter are brought about.

If a person, without the aid of instructors or books, investigate a subject and convince himself of certain facts or conclusions, of which he was ignorant before, he has produced an effect upon his own mind ; he has accomplished a human action upon his mind. Every discoverer, in this manner, produces effects upon his mind. But a man may produce effects upon his own mind in other ways. It is found that every object in the universe, when it impresses the mind, produces effects of some kind or other. Mere ideas, as we remarked above, produce their legitimate effects. Beauty, deformity, superiority, intelligence, stupidity, &c., each affect the mind in a certain manner. If then, a man desire to produce a certain effect upon his own mind, he need but repeatedly present the object adapted to

produce this effect, and the action will follow. For, by the laws of our Constitution, a man can no more present to his mind, even in idea, any object without experiencing the mental effect which the object is adapted to produce, than he can hold a live coal of fire in his hand, without experiencing the physical effect it is adapted to produce. A man, however, may be master of himself and present most frequently to his mind whatsoever objects or ideas he may choose, and consequently produce most frequently those effects which he may desire. Every one knows that man has passions, and that there are objects calculated to excite them. The devout man may become more devout by reflecting upon divinity; the wicked man may become more wicked by reflecting upon crime, and happily, the latter, by checking his mind and reflecting upon noble objects, may produce opposite effects, and change his own character.

Hence, a man may bring any object to produce sensation upon his body, or he may hold before his mind ideas of real or imaginary objects, and by so doing produce effects upon his own mind. The active capacity of the mind may, therefore, be brought to bear upon its passive capacity, and thus produce effects upon itself.

Let us next examine in what manner a man may produce effects upon the minds of others. And as all exertion originates in the mind, when this exertion makes to accomplish an action externally upon mind

or matter, the first effect is the putting the corporeal faculties of the actor in motion. Hence the corporeal faculties of an actor are active media, while those of the recipient are passive media, in all human actions produced by one mind upon another. And for producing actions upon the minds of others, the means made use of are oral conversation and instruction, signs and motions of the hands and face, as used by the deaf; written signs, as algebraic formulæ and the diagrams in several of the sciences; experiments exhibited to the senses; and written language. By the use of these means, men may produce on the minds of others almost every effect which the human mind is capable of receiving. One man may, *viva voce*, teach science to others; another may lead the minds of his fellow men into error; passions may be inflamed by oral or written compositions; prejudices may be awakened or eradicated by books; and aversions may be produced even by jesture. Since the invention of the printing press, the facility for producing effects upon mind has been astonishingly increased.

A single thought conveyed by language written upon paper, will frequently produce effects upon millions of minds.

Let us next consider actions upon matter. All exertion originates in the mind; the first effect produced upon matter by this exertion is the putting the body in motion. Thus, if a man desire to pick up a stick, the exertion of mind first moves and directs the arms

and hands, and these then move the stick. And it is obvious, that if the human mind were not thus mysteriously connected with a material mechanism, whose forces it can employ, it could produce no effect whatever upon external objects. Hence, from what we have said, it will be easy to understand in what manner all human actions upon matter are brought about. The exertion of the mind puts into operation the mechanical forces of the body, and directs them to a given object; this object possesses inherent qualities which the forces of the body direct, and so on until the final action has been accomplished.

Hence, all human actions upon matter are brought about by the powers of qualities of objects, and by powers obtained from mechanical arrangements of materials, which powers are put in force and directed by the exertion of the human mind.

CHAPTER IV.

OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

RIGHT and wrong are ideas. They are not affections, emotions or impulses. And like all ideas, they are derived in some manner. Let us inquire then, in what manner these ideas are obtained. Take a particular case. Two boys bring their slates with a certain arithmetical question upon them to the teacher, who, after examining them, pronounces the first boy's work to be right, and the other's to be wrong. Now, what does right and wrong mean here? I apprehend any person who reflects upon the question, will say, that the teacher pronounced the first boy's work to be right because it conformed to the established rules of arithmetic; and the other's wrong, because it did not conform to these rules. Right, then, in this case, is conformity to the rules of arithmetic; and wrong, non-conformity. Take another. Two pupils endeavor to play a piece of music upon the piano, the teacher looking on, says to the first, you play it right, and to the second, you play it wrong. In this case, it is evident that right and wrong are determined by the conformity or nonconformity to the rules of music. Take another case. Two men start from Philadelphia, to go to Reading; the one travels on the Reading turnpike,

but the other steers his course through New Jersey. After travelling a few hours, the first inquires if he be on the right road, and is told that he is ; the second also inquires, and is told that he is wrong. Here right and wrong are conformity or nonconformity to geographical lines. And we might produce thousands of cases, and we would always find that right is conformity to some established rule, law, or demarkation.

And it is plain that, there are a great many kinds of right ; each differing from others, as the conformity is to different rules, laws or demarkations. There is physical right, *i. e.* conformity to the laws of physics, mental right, geographical right, mathematical right, mechanical right, &c. And each of these rights has its corresponding wrong. And Blackstone divides the wrongs, of which municipal law takes cognizance, into *mala per se* and *mala prohibita* ; the first being a violation of the laws of God, and the latter, of the laws of man. Let us now consider what we mean by moral right and wrong. And moral right and wrong I apprehend, are determined in the same manner that all other rights and wrongs are ; the conformity or nonconformity being to the will of Deity. And whether any action be morally right or wrong, can be ascertained only by comparing it with this standard. Now I apprehend, it will be admitted by every person who reflects, that the will of Deity, if known, is a sure rule in all cases. And no person will presume to judge the Almighty in any case. The will of Deity, then, is

conclusive and ultimative. And that all men do obtain their ideas of moral right and wrong in this manner is abundantly proved by facts. Do not all Christians search the scriptures to discover God's revealed will, that they may know whether certain actions be morally right or wrong ? And is not the difference of opinion respecting the Deity's will, the very thing that makes one denomination act in a manner different from another ? Is not the Baptist immersed, and the Episcopalian confirmed by a bishop because each thinks he is acting in conformity to the will of God, and therefore it is morally right ? Do not all men throughout the world shape their actions, when they act in view of moral obligation, to the will or to what they suppose to be the will of Deity ? And if we observe a child, I apprehend we must discover, that it will imitate any action which it sees others do ; and though it may be restrained by fear, it will not refrain from that action on moral principle until there is instilled into its mind, that there is a good man or Deity who ever sees it, and frowns upon such actions. And I apprehend, we have many ideas which are derived by a process precisely similar to that of right and wrong. For instance, how do we derive the idea of difference ? We evidently think of one thing and then another, and compare the one with the other. And if the mind did not use this process, we could have no idea of difference. So also of resemblance of conformity, of contingency, and many others. And in this

manner, I apprehend, we derive the ideas of all kinds of right and wrong. And from this, it follows, that if men cannot agree respecting the will of Deity concerning a given action, they never can agree respecting the moral quality of that action. And hence the fact, that what is regarded as evidently morally right by one set of men, is regarded as evidently morally wrong by another, is easily accounted for. This contrariety of opinion always has existed, and always must exist, until the real will of Deity shall be made evident to the minds of all men. And this, I apprehend, explains all the phenomena of moral right and wrong which exist in the world.

It will be perceived, that the human mind might derive ideas of all kinds of right except moral right, were there no idea of the existence of the Deity in the world. But were all ideas of Deity blotted from the mind, moral right and wrong would be swept away with them. And as the Deity is the creator of all things, moral law, which expresses the Deity's will respecting human actions, cannot clash with any mental or physical law. And so far as men would obey the mental and physical laws of their constitution, thus far but no farther, they would obey moral law. But we must notice some of the objections to what we have said. Examples from ancient Greece and Rome are brought forward to show that men do not derive their notions of moral right from the Deity.

"The paganism of the ancient world produced, in-

deed, abominable gods, who on earth would have been shunned or punished as monsters ; and who offered as a picture of supreme happiness, only crimes to commit and passions to satiate. But vice armed with this sacred authority descended in vain from the eternal abode ; she found in the heart of man a moral instinct to repel her. The continence of Xenocrates was admired by those who celebrated the debaucheries of Jupiter. The chaste Lucretia adored the unchaste Venus. The most intrepid Roman sacrificed to fear. He invoked the god who dethroned his father, and died without a murmur by the hand of his own. The most contemptible divinities were served by the greatest men. The holy voice of nature stronger than that of the gods, made itself heard and respected and obeyed on earth, and seemed to banish to the confines of heaven, guilt and the guilty."* This argument seems to show that men do not derive the ideas of moral right and wrong from what is, or what they suppose to be, the will of Deity, but that these ideas are derived from our constitution. It must be recollected, however, that the idea of Deity was among men long before the existence of the gods spoken of by Rousseau.

Mythologists suppose that those gods were once men who had acted a conspicuous part on earth, and after death had been deified. However this may be, it is at least evident, that the ancient pagans at some

* Quoted from Rousseau by Wayland.

period made those gods. And of course, they must have had previous ideas of divinity, or they could have deified nothing. The idea must always exist, before it can be given habitation or character.

Greece indeed, attributed human passions of the basest sort to a divine existence. But the idea of a divine existence was not derived from those gods. On the contrary those gods originated from this idea. And Greece herself made them, prescribed laws for them, assigned them their dominion, and attributed to them actions. And had every idea of those fabulous gods been blotted from the mind of the pagan world, the idea of divinity would have remained. When the religion of a country changes, all that makes part of that religion is frequently swept away. The idea of divinity, however, which is the foundation of every religion, remains; and upon this the succeeding religion is reared. When the pagan religion fell, the gods were annihilated, for they were but part of a religious structure, and not the foundation upon which the structure was built. A substratum of a crude natural theology underlies every religion which has or does exist in the world. Again, the great men of Greece and Rome had an idea of Deity entirely distinct and exclusive of those fabled gods, as taught by mythologist, poet or priest.

The idea of the existence of a divine intelligence, who had created all things, existed in Egypt before the Grecian history commences. And in Greece this

idea was believed and taught by Thales, by Anaxagoras, Socrates, and by Plato and the whole Socratic school. Subsequently the Roman philosophers taught the same thing. Again, it is not the fact, that the ideas which the great men of Greece and Rome entertained respecting the character of Divinity, corresponded at all with the characters which the mythologists, poets and priests attributed to the gods. The writings of Plato and Cicero exhibit far nobler notions. And respecting those gods themselves, the same language which in a later period of Roman history, Gibbon applies to the men of Rome, may with much propriety be applied to the more ancient history of Rome and Greece. "Many," says Gibbon, "considered them (the religions of polytheism) as equally true, many as equally false, and many as equally politic."

There were, no doubt, many who never employed their minds in reflecting, but took those gods as examples. And as were their gods, so were they. And let any one carefully observe the Indian, or any other heathen nation, and I apprehend, he will be convinced that their moral notions exactly correspond with their ideas of the will of the Great Spirit or Deity.

But it is said, that we have a constitutional moral sense from which we derive our notions of right and wrong. Now, if our minds be thus constituted, we can detect moral right and wrong by an appeal to this internal sense. For instance, to our constitutions we appeal to ascertain whether an apple be sour or sweet,

and our organs of taste are so constituted as to give us the ideas of these qualities. And to another part of our constitution we appeal for our idea of black and white. Let us, then, make this appeal to our constitutions for the ideas of moral right and wrong. To worship idols made by hands, is wrong, says the Christian. These are our gods, and it is right to prostrate ourselves before them, say the Hindoos. And we need not adduce and multiply examples to show the contrariety of opinion in regard to what action is right and what wrong; for the examples are as numerous as the actions which involve the question of moral right and wrong. And hence it is evident, that different individuals attribute opposite moral qualities to the same object. Suppose now, we present an object for different individuals to determine the color. The first says, it is black; the second, it is white; the third, it is red; and the fourth, it is green. Now the object must either be a chameleon, or these persons must have differently constituted organizations. It may be said, that these persons must have had previous ideas of black, green, &c., or they could not have predicated either of the qualities of the object. But black and green are recognized because we are constituted to perceive them by the sense of sight. And we see black the first time an object possessing it is presented to our eyes. And having given this quality a name, we affirm it of other objects, which we perceive to possess it.

And it is to be observed, that through all our constitutional senses we derive the knowledge of the existence of any quality, from some object in which this quality is inherent. Thus, were not some object possessing inherent sweetness presented to our taste, we would never know that such a quality was in existence. And there may be many qualities in an object of which we know nothing, because we have no sense to make us acquainted with them. But when an object possessing a certain quality is presented for the first time to the appropriate sense, we then, for the first time, perceive that there is such a quality in existence. If then, we obtain the knowledge of moral right through a constitutional sense, some actions, in which this quality is inherent, must be presented to this sense or we could never know that right existed. Now, if we admit, that there are a few actions which all mankind acknowledge to be right, i. e., to have this quality inherent in them, and, that from these actions men derive the notion of moral right; the moral sense hypothesis will still fail to account for the difference of opinion respecting other actions. Suppose each of six men to taste of each of six apples, and they all agree that all of these apples have the same taste, i. e. possess a certain quality, to which quality they give the name of sweet. Suppose also, they all taste of six other apples, and agree that these all possess a certain quality very different from the first, to which quality they give the name of sour. Now if these men's consti-

tutions be alike when they use the term sweet, they will all have the same notion of the quality spoken of. And so also of sour.

Suppose now, six other apples be introduced. Two of the men say they are sweet; two say, they are sour; and two say, they possess neither of these qualities. Here indeed, is a miracle. For if these men's constitutions be in every respect alike, this difference of opinion cannot exist. But again, suppose a certain number of men to possess all the senses which belong to human nature, yet it is evident, that the same sense, in different individuals, differs in activity and acuteness; and different individuals differ widely in the discriminating power of each sense. Thus, some can discriminate colors more correctly than others; while others can detect differences in objects of touch which the former do not perceive. And perhaps two persons cannot be found in whom the same sense is equally susceptible, active and acute. Will this, on the moral sense hypothesis, account for the difference of opinion respecting moral right and wrong?

Suppose two men undertake to point out the objects which possess the quality of black. One of the men possesses a susceptible and discriminating sense of colors; while the other's is unpracticed and obtuse. Now, if both of these men have an idea of the quality of black, i. e. mean the same thing by this term, then it is evident, that some object possessing this quality in a sufficiently apparent degree, must have been pre-

sented to the sense of the dull man; otherwise he could not have known that there was such a quality in existence. And it is obvious that where this quality was sufficiently apparent to be perceived by the man of obtuse sense, it would more readily be perceived by the man of acute sense. And so of other qualities. Hence, no difference of opinion could exist so long as the quality was sufficiently apparent to be perceived by the one whose sense is obtuse. And I think it will be admitted, that two opposite qualities cannot exist in the same object at the same time; and that when a man mistakes one quality for another, there must be a sufficient resemblance between the two to cause this mistake. But two opposite qualities which are perceived by the same sense cannot be made to resemble each other. Thus, two objects may possess qualities of color so nearly resembling each other as to be mistaken for the same, while their qualities of taste may be opposite. But sour cannot be made to resemble sweet. For as soon as it begins to become less unlike sweet, it begins to cease to be the same original quality. Therefore one quality cannot be mistaken for its opposite, on account of the resemblance between the two.

To return, then, to our acute and obtuse sense men.

When a quality was not sufficiently apparent to be perceived by the man of obtuse sense, it would be gone from the object, for aught he would know; but it could not resemble an opposite quality so that the

man might mistake this resemblance for the opposite quality itself. Thus, a piece of goods may possess the quality of black in such a degree that an unpractised man may be unable to determine whether it be black, or some other color which nearly resembles black. But so long as black is inherent in the goods, no man will mistake it for white, the opposite quality. And hence, I think the moral sense hypothesis entirely fails to account for the phenomena.

CHAPTER V.

TO WHAT, IN HUMAN ACTIONS, MORAL RIGHT AND WRONG ATTACH.

IN Chapter third, we considered human actions with reference to the mind of the actor, and with reference to the objects upon which they are produced. Let us now examine them in order to see, to what and in what manner moral right and wrong attach. Let us commence with that division with reference to the mind of the actor. Of these the first class is intentional actions. We have shown the manner by which they are brought about, to be, by a conception of the proposed action; by the determination of the will, and by the intention, which consists in adopting those

antecedents which will produce the desired consequent, *i. e.*, by the adapting means to accomplish an end. Hence there are four things to be considered in every intentional action, viz: the conception, the determination of the will, the intention, and the effect produced, *i. e.*, the action itself.

Now, to the conception of an action, I apprehend, moral right and wrong do not attach. For, if they do, then a person cannot read intelligently any book which speaks of wrong actions, or be accidentally witness to any evil, without participating in crime. And the mere conception of a right action would confer merit on an individual.

Of the determination of the will.—Let us suppose a certain action to have no moral quality whatever; there then could certainly be no moral quality attached to the determination of the will to do, or to refrain from it. For, the will is a faculty of the mind, which the Deity has created. The determination of the will is an exertion of this faculty. Now, there can be wrong in the exertion of any faculty only when this exertion is put forth in a wrong direction. The wrong then lies in the direction, and not in the mere exertion itself. Hence, moral right or wrong attaches to the determination of the will, as this determination makes to accomplish a morally right or wrong action.

Of the intention.—We have already stated, that by intention, we mean, the adapting means to accomplish an end. Let us now enquire further into it. Take

an example of an action upon matter. Suppose a man desire conveniently to obtain water from a well. He first cuts down a tree; then bores it; then fixes a stationary valve in it; then attaches a valve to a pump-rod, and joins this to a handle, which he places in the top of the pump; he then puts the pump thus completed into the well; and then pumps and receives the water. Now, if we examine this chain of actions, we will perceive, that each step in itself is a complete action; and that each preceding action is a necessary antecedent to the next succeeding one, *i. e.*, each step is a mean adapted to accomplish the next step. Each of these steps the judgment determined the will to adopt, as a proper antecedent to accomplish the end, which the will had first determined upon. Intention in the mind, therefore, is the determining the will by the judgment.

Tracing the intention, then, we will find, that the man cut the tree with the intention of boring it, *i. e.*, the cutting the tree the judgment determined the will to adopt as an antecedent to accomplish the boring; he bored it with the intention of fixing valves and a rod in it; he placed the whole pump into the well with the intention of pumping; and he pumped with the intention of obtaining water.

In like manner, intention may be traced from the first determination of the will to accomplish an end to all intentional actions. And it obviously enters into all the actions anterior to the ultimate one, but

into this it does not enter. And we must observe, that, intention frequently enters into several actions beyond the last one, which we perceive. Thus: If a man take a rifle, shoot an individual and rob him of his money, we can perceive intention in taking the rifle and in shooting the individual; these are antecedents to the robbery. But we can trace it no further; for, we cannot tell with what intention the man took the money, *i. e.*, what consequent would be made to follow this antecedent. But no doubt, intention did enter into this action, *i. e.*, the judgment determined the will to use this antecedent to procure a consequent. Perhaps, the man took the money, designing it as an antecedent to obtaining fine clothes; and perhaps, he procured these to gratify pride. Intention, however, always stops in the action which immediately precedes the ultimate effect, which the actor has in view. And in intentional actions, as intention, *i. e.*, the adapting means to accomplish an end, stands between the first determination of the will and the proposed action, it is always mentally and physically right, *i. e.*, the knowledge of the nature of things, and the proper antecedents have been possessed and used. Now, in no other sense than the one we have given, can intention enter, in any manner, into any action whatever.*

* We frequently use the verb *intend*, the noun *intention*, the adjective *intentional*, and the adverb *intentionally*, to express the determination of the will. As, "I intend to live in town next winter;"

And to the operation of mind of determining the will by the judgment, which operation constitutes intention in the mind, moral right or wrong can attach only as this operation makes to accomplish a morally right or wrong action. Suppose a doctor to be called to visit a sick man, and from some reason or other, he should administer medicine with the intention of killing the patient, but from a misapprehension of the qualities of the drugs, he should give just such things as would restore the man to health. Here, I apprehend, every man would say, that the doctor's determination was wrong, and that the intention of the doctor, *i. e.*, the adapting means to accomplish this end, was wrong also, and because it made to accomplish a wrong action. We will perceive, that here the effect produced is an accidental one, and that in the intention there are mental and physical wrongs, *i. e.*, the willful end did not follow the antecedents used, while the guilt charged to the doctor's character results from the attachment of moral wrong to the determination of the will and to the endeavor to carry this determination into execution, *i. e.*, to the intention.*

"He did it intentionally." "It is my intention to visit the Lake," etc. We have spoken of the determination of the will, and this meaning must not be confounded with the meaning given to intention in the text.

Dr. Wayland tells us that the moral quality of actions resides in the intention, and gives the following example to show it:

"A. and B. both give to C. a piece of money. They both conceived of this action before they performed it. They both resolved

Let us next examine accidental actions.—In accidental actions, moral right or wrong cannot, in any man-

to do precisely what they did. In all this both actions coincide. A., however, gave it to C. with the intention of procuring the murder of a friend; B. with the intention of relieving a family in distress. It is evident that in this the intention gives to the action its character of right or wrong."

It will be perceived upon reflection that, in this example given by Dr. Wayland, the physical actions, *i. e.*, the placing the pieces of money in the hands of C., were designed as antecedents to two actions of opposite character upon mind, viz: the influencing the mind of C. to murder and to benevolence. It will be further perceived that, these antecedents in themselves could never have produced the effects designed upon the mind of C., unless other antecedents had been used in connexion with them, viz: language or signs. And had these other antecedents not been used, no further action corresponding to those determined by the will of A. and B. could have been produced by C., except by coincidence. And had the affair stopped with placing the pieces of money in the hands of C., all that could have occurred, would have been the attachment of moral right and wrong to the determinations of the will of A. and B. respectively. If, however, any action corresponding to those determined by A. and B. succeeded intentionally, *i. e.*, by the intention of A. or B., the receiving money by C., it followed by reason of this other antecedent's connection with the bestowing the money. And to these other antecedents, *i. e.*, the advising to murder and to benevolence, moral right and wrong respectively attach. For, they are in themselves, right and wrong respectively. And it may be further remarked that, considering the connection of these other antecedents with the bestowing the money, A. and B.'s actions thus far, do not coincide at all, but are opposite in their character.

The fallacy of this doctrine of Wayland, however, will be, perhaps, more easily perceived by adopting the *reductio ad absurdum*. Human actions are either right or wrong in themselves, or they become so from the intention of the actor. Let us, therefore, admit that, human actions receive their moral qualities from the intention of the actor, and that in themselves they possess no moral quality.

ner, attach to the determination of the will. For the will never determined to produce them. Neither can anything be affirmed of the conception; because the identical effect was not conceived of before it took place. Nor can any moral quality be attached to the intention. For, the intention to produce the actual effect, did not enter into any of the antecedents to the consequent action.

Let us next consider experimental actions. In these the determination of the will, the intention, and the conception, all have reference to the intentional actions, which immediately precede them. And intentional actions, we have already considered. We need not, therefore, examine experimental actions with reference to the mind of the actor.

Let us next examine actions with reference to the objects upon which they are produced. Suppose a person should produce the same effect upon a man and

Wherever the intention be morally right, then the action, into which this intention enters, must be right also, and *vice versa*. Those persons, therefore, who sacrifice human victims to please the Almighty, perform morally right actions. For, we will all admit, that to endeavor to please God is right. But it may be said, that human sacrifice does not please the Creator, but incurs his displeasure. What of that! If men from an error of judgment believe, that human sacrifice will please the Deity, and do it with this intention, *i. e.*, adopt this means to accomplish that end, the intention, though mentally wrong, producing an accidental instead of the effect aimed at, is yet morally right, because it endeavors to do right, and in this intention resides the moral quality of the action, which is therefore morally right also.

upon a sheep. And suppose this effect to be death. I apprehend, men would say, that this same effect, in the one case, was wrong, and in the other not. And if we inquire why it is thus, I apprehend they will tell us, that it is wrong to produce death upon a man, though it be not so to kill a sheep. And this is the same thing as saying that, it is morally wrong to produce a given effect upon certain objects, while it is not so to produce the same effect upon others. And this doctrine, I apprehend, is sound philosophy. But if it be said, that men, who hold it to be morally wrong to take the life of an innocent man, nevertheless in cases of hydrophobia, and in war, do not consider it wrong to kill men, it only confirms our position, that it is morally wrong to produce a given effect upon some objects, and not upon others. For, in hydrophobia, and in an unjust war, men are different objects from what they are when free from hydrophobia and not inflicting wrong. The sum of the matter is, that those human actions which are consistent with the will of the Creator, are morally right *per se*, and those contrary to His will are morally wrong *per se*. And it matters not, whether the actions be intentional, accidental or experimental, so far as relates to the actions, though intentional actions are the only ones which affect the character of the actor, as we shall see by and by.

CHAPTER VI.

CONSCIENCE.

WE have seen in Chapter IV. that, right and wrong depend upon the laws which the Creator has established, *i. e.*, upon the will of Deity. And as in a State without a supreme power to prescribe laws, there would be no municipal law, and consequently, no legal right or wrong, so, without a moral law-giver, there would be no moral law, and consequently no moral right or wrong. And as moral right and wrong depend upon the will of Deity, every human action in itself must be either right or wrong. For, if we say that, there are some actions, of which the commission or omission is no violation of moral law, these actions, as they do not violate moral law, must be consistent with the will of Deity. The omission of them, however, cannot be wrong. Thus: If a resident of Philadelphia, who has no obligation to keep him at home, go to New-York, or stay at home, he has done no wrong in either case. Neither, if a person walking along the banks of the Schuylkill, should pick up a stone and throw it into the water, or omit to throw it in, would he have done any wrong. There is, however, another class of actions, the omitting to perform which is morally wrong. For, the will of Deity makes

them obligatory. Now, all men will admit that, there is something meant by the term conscience. And all men will agree that, conscience has a relation, in some manner, to moral right and wrong, and to nothing else. Some authors suppose conscience to be a faculty of the mind, which, independently of the reflective faculties, and independently of all previous ideas, teaches men what actions are morally right or wrong.

We believe there is no such faculty, sense, or instinct, in the human mind; but that, the ideas of moral right and wrong are obtained in the manner stated in Chapter IV.

Now, there are six states of mind, which, I apprehend, are comprehended by the term conscience.—

- 1st. Moral approval and disapproval.
- 2d. Moral impulsion and repulsion.
- 3d. Moral satisfaction and remorse.

Now, moral approval and disapproval must follow after intellections. For, if a man approve of any action, on any other ground than moral right, then it is not a moral approval. But if he approve of an action because, he believes it to be morally right, then moral right is in his mind. And it is impossible to morally approve or disapprove of any action, without, first, having ideas of moral right and wrong. If then, ideas of moral right and wrong always precede these states of mind, and if these states cannot exist without them, then, it must be evident that, these ideas cause moral approval and disapproval, *i. e.*, moral approval

and disapproval are the effects which follow the impressions of moral right or wrong upon the mind.

And, I apprehend, authors have confounded moral approval with others of a very different character. Suppose a man to snatch a child from its mother's arms, and throw it under the cylinder of a threshing machine. Would not the mother become frantic? Would not her feelings greatly disapprove of the action? Yet, I apprehend, she would not, at the time, consider whether the action were morally right or wrong. Neither would she immediately, morally disapprove of it. Maternal affection is not conscience. Again; if we should be looking at three men trying to lift a bar of iron without being able, and another man should pick up the bar and walk off with it, we would all join in the applause.

Yet conscience would have nothing at all to do with our approbation. And there are thousands of actions, of which we approve or disapprove, where the approbation or disapprobation flows from a part of our constitution very different from conscience. Taste will have much to do with it. The Indian besmears his face and puts rings in his nose, and thinks it becoming to do so; while persons of refinement disapprove of these actions.

Next; we are impelled by conscience to do those actions, the omission of which we believe to be wrong, and repelled from those which we believe to be wrong in themselves. And these states of mind are evident-

ly caused by the ideas of moral right and wrong, *i. e.*, they are the effects which follow the impression of these ideas upon the mind. Hence, ideas of moral right and wrong produce feelings of moral obligation. And as moral right and wrong depend upon the will of Deity, if we mistake this will, conscience will impel us towards a wrong action, with the same force as though the action were really right, and *vice versa*. The same thing is observable in other cases. If a man mistake the moonlight shadow of a bush for a wild beast, he will be impelled to run with the same force, as though there were really a lion in the way. And of so great force are the feelings of moral obligation that, where a person firmly believes a certain course to be morally right, and an opposite course to be morally wrong, he must pursue the former at all hazards, or become miserable. Where the belief is firm, feelings of moral obligation will be obeyed. And hence, the phenomena of men dying at the stake rather than to renounce the tenets of true or false religions, are easily accounted for. Feelings of moral obligation, however, do not affect all men thus strongly. The ideas of moral right and wrong are but little attended to, and consequently make but little impression upon some minds. And these men make some other than moral principle, their rule of action.

But, I apprehend, authors have also confounded moral impulsion and repulsion, with other feelings. We are told that, when we feel we ought to do so and

so, this feeling is the moral impulse. If I understand the meaning of feeling that, we ought to act thus and so, it is, that we are impelled to a certain course. The impulse may be moral obligation, self-love, maternal affection, or any other. It is the moral impulse only, when we believe it to be morally right to do so, and to omit to do so to be morally wrong. Any person of tender sensibility would be repelled from an ugly worm. But who would suppose this feeling to be moral repulsion? Now, when we feel that, we ought to do an action, because we believe it to be morally right, and the omission of it to be morally wrong, we are then impelled by moral obligation, and we are then acting under the noblest impulse of our nature. For, as moral right depends upon the will of God, when we perceive his will, and are impelled by our moral feelings to fulfill it, all things else to the contrary, here is "action, godlike action."

Next, of moral satisfaction and remorse.—These are states of mind, which occur after we have accomplished an action. They are evidently produced by the ideas of moral right and wrong together with the consciousness of having fulfilled or violated moral obligation. Every person can make himself conscious of the fact that, if he believe an action to be morally right, and feel under moral obligation to accomplish it, he will feel, after its accomplishment, a moral satisfaction with himself,—a noble elevation of mind. I presume most men have experienced this state of

mind. And on the other hand, if happily we have not experienced remorse, we have but too many examples of intelligent men, who having passed most of their lives in immoral practices, have at the close of life experienced all the bitterness, which this painful state of mind produces.

Now, that the states of mind above spoken of do occur, I think no one can doubt. And I think it is evident, they are brought up in the manner stated. Ideas of moral right and wrong produce moral approval and disapproval; after these follows moral obligation, *i. e.*, moral impulsion and repulsion; we then act or refrain from acting; then comes moral satisfaction or remorse. And these states of mind, I apprehend, make up what we call conscience.

But if it be asked why these states of mind occur in the manner above stated, we may also ask why ideas of danger produce fear? or why certain objects produce love and others aversion. The only answer which can be given to these questions, is that, the Creator has made our constitutions such that, they are acted upon in this manner.

Now, from what has been said it must be evident that these states of mind may interchange. If we once believed an action to be wrong, and felt under moral obligation to refrain from it, but our intellects have since changed our belief respecting it, we may now have a moral approval and feel under moral obligation to perform it, and *vice versa*. And it may

be further observed that, we may morally approve or disapprove of other men's actions ; but moral obligation, and moral satisfaction and remorse have respect to our own actions only.

CHAPTER VII.

SELF-LOVE.

IF a farmer who had two fields, could by the cultivation of one in wheat and the other in corn, raise five hundred bushels of wheat and a like quantity of corn, but by the cultivation of the former in corn and the latter in wheat, he could raise one thousand bushels of each, and therefore he should adopt this latter arrangement, the impulse which influenced his mind to adopt this system, is called self-love. Now, we have said that there are many actions right in themselves, the omitting to perform which is not wrong. To choose which of these we shall perform and which omit, is for self-love to decide. And moved by this principle, conscientious men apply their industry to capital in that manner, which they suppose will be the most beneficial to themselves. On this principle also, the honest mariner ploughs the deep ; the economist curtails his expenses, and the emigrant moves to foreign lands. In a conscientious mind, self-love is always subordinate,

holding sway only in actions indifferent to conscience, and is in itself a noble principle. And a man who does not act upon it, can have no regard for his own happiness. In minds influenced but little by moral feelings, however, self-love becomes self-interest, which frequently has no respect for the rights or feelings of others, and which is generally the parent of selfishness and meanness.

Now there are plainly many courses in life, all of which are indifferent to conscience. And it often happens, that two or more objects of desire are presented to the mind, while it is possible to obtain only one of them. And were a person destitute of self-love, he would grasp after the object which most excited his desire, without respect to the comparative happiness which might follow. And where the enjoyment of an object was not considered wrong, and consequently unchecked by conscience, without self-love strong desires would be unduly gratified. And each man, though conscientious, would follow after desire in a course of inutility and even perhaps of misery.

Self-love regulates this tendency in the constitution, and by impelling men to seek for themselves the greatest amount of happiness, raises noble minds from a state of conscientious misery to moral happiness.

CHAPTER VIII.

VIRTUE.

If we inquire why a man is either virtuous or vicious, I apprehend we will find, that it must be either with reference to his determinations, his intentions, or his actions. If these be all morally right, the man must be virtuous. If they be all morally wrong, he is undoubtedly vicious. It is necessary, therefore, to examine each of these with reference to the character of the actor. And first we will examine them in intentional actions.

First, Of the determination of the will.—A man, who resolves to do what he believes to be wrong, mankind I apprehend, hold to be a vicious character. And he who determines to do what he believes to be morally right, is considered, so far as the determination of the will is concerned, a virtuous character. To be virtuous, however, so far as the determination of the will is concerned, the will must be determined to do what the man believes to be right, because he does believe it to be morally right, and for no other reason. For although a man should firmly believe it to be morally right to pray to God, and should determine to do so, not however from his belief in its moral right, but merely because he expected in this manner to gain the

esteem of his fellow men, this man could not be virtuous, even so far as the determination of the will is concerned.

The desire to do what is believed to be morally right, because it is believed to be morally right, must therefore, always determine the will, in order that a man may be virtuous with reference to his determinations. And this desire is always induced in the mind by conscience, and can be induced by nothing else.

Second, Of the intention.—We have before explained the meaning of intention. And I apprehend that so far as the intention is concerned, a person is virtuous or vicious, as the intention is to produce these actions, which the actor believes to be morally right or wrong. If a person believe it to be morally right to kill his neighbor and make use of poison to accomplish this action, I cannot see but that so far as the intention is concerned, the murderer is virtuous. Every man who acts upon moral principle, must do that which he honestly believes to be morally right. He can do nothing else. And hence, if a person who acts upon moral principle be vicious, it must be from some other cause than the intention.

Third, Of actions.—We have said that human actions in themselves are either right or wrong. Now if we suppose a person to accomplish conscientiously a given action, and we should go to those men who believe this action to be morally right, and inquire whether the person had acted virtuously or not, I apprehend

they would not hesitate for a moment in answering that he had. Neither do men hesitate in saying, that others act viciously when the latter conscientiously do those things which the former believe to be moral crimes.

And this shows us the manner the human mind views the actions of men with reference to virtue. A man who believes certain actions to be morally right and certain others to be morally wrong, considers all men as virtuous, who conscientiously determine, intend, and do the former, and abstain from the latter. Moral right and wrong in actions, however, are immutably established by the Deity, and the opinions of men cannot affect them in any manner. And respecting what actions are morally right and what ones wrong, men may be in ignorance. And this ignorance of the will of the Creator may be unavoidable or willful. Unavoidable ignorance is viewed with compassion by the human mind, and from analogy we would suppose this to be the case with the Creator. If, however, a man do those things which men consider morally wrong, they do not regard the man as virtuous, though his ignorance of the moral wrong in his actions be unavoidable. On the other hand, willful ignorance in itself is regarded by all men as wrong and of itself it vitiates the character. Ignorance, therefore, cannot make a person virtuous with reference to his actions. Now as moral right and wrong are immutably established by the Creator, from what has been

said respecting determination, intention and action, it follows that that man only is virtuous who knows what actions are morally right, and what ones are obligatory upon himself, and conscientiously determines, intends, and when in his power does the latter, and determines, intends, and does those things only which are in themselves right.

But he who is really virtuous, possesses virtue. Hence virtue in intentional actions, consists in the knowledge of what actions are morally right, and what ones obligatory, and in the conscientiously determining, intending, and doing only the will of the Creator.

Let us next examine accidental actions with reference to virtue. It will be recollected that in accidental actions, the determination of the will and the intention make towards an intentional action. We have therefore, already examined them. The intentional action towards which they make, we have also examined. And as the accidental action which is really produced is in no manner a willful one, it cannot affect the character of an individual. There is but one thing, therefore, of which we need speak. And that is ignorance of the means employed to produce the intentional actions, by which ignorance the accidental action is brought about. This ignorance also, may be unavoidable or willful. If it be unavoidable, I apprehend mankind do not consider the moral character of a man to be affected by it. If a man should endeavor to rescue a person from a burning house,

and should employ means which to the best of his judgment were calculated to produce this effect, I apprehend he would be considered virtuous, even though the very use of these means should be the cause of not saving the person's life. If, however, a person undertake to produce an intentional effect, and the knowledge of the means to be employed be within his power and he will not obtain it, this man cannot be virtuous. For he does not care what effect his exertions may produce, and therefore he acts not at all upon moral principle.

Next of experimental actions.—In these, it will be recollected that the determination of the will and the intention make towards and accomplish an intentional action, which is the immediate antecedent to the experimental one. And as we have examined intentional actions throughout, and as an experimental action, not being a willful one, cannot affect the character, we need not speak further on this point.

And from what has been said, it will appear that the definition given of virtue in intentional actions, is the same for all actions. It may be stated in other language thus, he who knows and conscientiously does the will of the Creator is virtuous in the eyes of God. Hence, virtue is the knowing and, as far as in our power, doing the will of the Creator only, under a feeling of moral obligation.*

* Paley tells us, that, "Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happi-

Now from what has been said, it will appear evident upon slight reflection, that virtue may be progressive. A man who resolves to do what is right, may increase in the knowledge of moral right from childhood to extreme old age; and consequently his virtue may increase from day to day throughout his whole life.

Theologians may, perhaps, show this progress to continue through the endless cycles of eternity. Our inquiries have reference only to man's existence on earth. And not only is it the case that an individual may increase in virtue, but nations may become more virtuous from generation to generation.

Virtue may also retrograde in individuals and in nations. And whatever may be the quantity of virtue in an individual or in a nation, vice will always be in an inverse ratio to it. It may be remarked further, that all our faculties, and all our feelings and affections, may be improved or impaired by habit. Hence he who would improve in virtue, should firmly resolve to obey every moral law with which he is acquainted; and by so doing he will make his progress in virtue easy, and shut the door against vice.

ness." If a man were cast on an uninhabited island, he could no longer do good to mankind, and must therefore cease to be virtuous.

CHAPTER IX.

HUMAN HAPPINESS.

HAPPINESS is a term that can appropriately be applied only to animate beings. We cannot with any propriety say, that a rock is either happy or unhappy. And if we inquire why a rock may not be happy or unhappy, I apprehend, we will find it to be, because the rock is incapable of experiencing either pleasure or pain. Now this explanation of the inability of the rock, will put us on the right road to ascertain in what human happiness consists, in what manner it is brought about, in what manner its degree varies, and in what way we may secure the greatest amount. For happiness is undoubtedly a consequent which invariably follows certain antecedents, and is regulated by fixed laws. First then, of what human happiness consists.—Man is composed of mind and body. And whatever may be the essence of mind, we know that the body is essentially material. And but for the mind, man would be in the same condition respecting happiness, as the rock. The mind, therefore, is the thing that becomes happy or unhappy. Now if we inquire of any man why he is pursuing a certain object, I apprehend we will always find that he either experiences pleasure in the pursuit, or he expects to expe-

rience pleasure in the possession, i. e., to be ultimately made happy. And I apprehend, that human happiness consists in nothing else than in the experiencing pleasure.

The musician cultivates music because he experiences pleasure in the concord of sweet sounds. And his happiness, so far as music affects it, consists in this pleasure. The devout man cultivates religion, in which he experiences pleasure, and he expects ultimately to experience the pleasure of the blest in paradise. And from this it follows, that all men will not derive their happiness from the same objects, unless their constitutions be alike affected by those objects. But this is not the case. One man experiences most pleasure in literature, another in painting, another in the exercise of his physical faculties, and so on. But in whatever walk or occupation in life a man may be happy, his happiness consists in experiencing pleasure. Pain is the opposite of pleasure, and misery its consequent. It is, however, not sufficient for happiness that a man should be free from pain. Happiness is a positive thing, and pleasure must be experienced or happiness cannot exist. When a person is in a sound sleep, free from dreams, he experiences neither pleasure nor pain; he is neither happy nor unhappy. This part of our existence, nature has reserved for herself, that she may invigorate the faculties and apply her healing hand to the wounds of mind and body.

Next, of the manner in which human happiness is

brought about.—We have attributed happiness to the mind. It is, however, by means of the body that the mind becomes acquainted with the external world. If we should suppose a person to come into life without any sense of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing, such a person could not know anything whatever about the world, and could not be happy or miserable in it.

Now, I apprehend, our constitutions are such, that we experience a conscious pleasure in discovering the mere existence of things. This may be noticed in a child. How pleased it is to discover objects of which before it had no knowledge. And every chemist who has discovered an elementary substance, or new compound, can testify to the same fact. And we have all heard what excess of pleasure Newton experienced when he discovered the universal law of gravitation; and how Columbus was overwhelmed with joy upon his discovering America.

But our bodies not only make us acquainted with the existence of objects, but also with their qualities. And the qualities of objects affect the mind in two ways. First, when perception is preceded by sensation, we immediately experience pleasure or pain from these qualities. Thus, the perception of sweet in honey is preceded by a sensation upon the organ of taste, and we immediately experience pleasure. And an object may be taken into the stomach, whose qualities will produce sensations of pleasure or pain, before

we perceive those qualities to be inherent in the object. Second, when perception is to be followed by sensation, the qualities of objects awaken in the mind desire or aversion. Thus, we may perceive, by the eye and sense of smell, certain qualities in an apple, and these perceived qualities awaken in the mind a desire to apply them to the palate. But desire may also arise from the perception of certain circumstances, relations or conditions, which we may suppose will make us happy. Thus, one man may desire a civil office, another military glory, a third intellectual distinction, and so on. Now the gratification of desire is the applying some perceived qualities, circumstances, relations or conditions, to that part of our constitutions, upon which they will produce sensations of pleasure.

But again, we experience pleasure by the exercise of our mental faculties, in comparing ideas, in tracing resemblances and differences, in tracing dependencies and relations and in contemplating the works of creation, &c. Hence, human happiness is brought about by sensations upon our organs of sense, and by exercising our mental and corporeal faculties upon subjects and objects, whose inherent qualities produce pleasure.

Next of the degree of happiness.—This will always vary directly as the intensity of the pleasure experienced. Thus, two persons may both experience pleasure from strains of music. In one, however, the plea-

sure may be more intense, and consequently he will derive a greater degree of happiness from music than the other. And thus it is with every source from which men derive happiness.

Next of the greatest amount of happiness.—In estimating the greatest amount of happiness which any person may enjoy, we must take time into the account. If a man whose life was thirty years, should be made happy in the highest degree by the use of his eyes for ten years, and then become blind, he could not experience as great an amount of happiness from the eye, as he would have done had his sight remained with him through life. And the same may be said of every source of happiness. Hence a man will enjoy the greatest amount of happiness from any source, when that source supplies him from the cradle to the tomb. But a person cannot enjoy the greatest amount of happiness of which human nature is capable, unless he can draw from every source, from which a man with perfect faculties may derive happiness. A deaf man, whose life should be just as long as another's who had all his faculties perfect, could not enjoy as great an amount of happiness as the other.

For the latter has one more source than the former from which to derive happiness. Now every part of mind and body is a source of happiness. And if an individual would secure to himself the greatest amount of happiness of which his being is capable, he must watch over all the springs of happiness, and see that none be dried up by ignorance or folly.

We may remark further, that when we experience pain, we are sure that some harm is affecting our constitution. This harm is sometimes very slight and we soon recover from it. Sometimes, however, it is very serious, and deprives us even of life. But when we experience pleasure, we are not so sure that no harm is done us. A man may experience pleasure in eating a good dinner, but that very dinner may make him sick. Hence, it is necessary that knowledge should direct our enjoyments in a certain manner and amount.

Now it belongs to the political economist to explain in what way objects for our physical happiness may be obtained. It belongs to the physician to show in what manner these blessings may be used consistently with health. And the mental philosopher must explain the laws of mind which cannot be violated without loss of happiness. It remains for us in a future chapter to show the will of the Creator respecting human happiness.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

THE WILL OF DEITY.

IF we admit that everything which exists, has been created by an omniscient Creator, it will follow, that each particular thing must have been created by design. For, an intelligent machinist makes no particular item in the mechanism which he constructs, without design. Each particular part is always intended to perform some function, to add strength or durability, to give beauty, or to fill up some void which might occur in the arrangement. And as the human machinist does not make any thing without design, it is very unreasonable, and indeed absurd, to suppose that an omniscient being should.

Now if we knew all the designs of the Creator respecting the existence of each thing created on earth, and respecting its relations to other things, we would then be acquainted with the whole will of Deity respecting the world and the things in it. For, the will of Deity must have had reference to the existence of each object, and to the preservation of itself or of its species, for at least a period of time, and to each ob-

ject's relations to other objects in a system. Whether man will ever possess such knowledge, we do not know. But, that much knowledge of the Creator's will may be learned from nature is evident. For in all the works of nature, which we understand, we can perceive intention, *i. e.*, the adapting means to accomplish an end. And wherever we can perceive the intention, we may also discern the will of the Creator. For, we cannot suppose an omniscient being to produce accidental or experimental effects. Now all nature is divided into three classes of objects, viz : unorganized, organized inanimate, and organized animate objects. In unorganized objects, the human mind can perceive intention by considering the effects which they produce on organized objects. Thus, carbon, in itself considered, exhibits no intention. If, however, we be made certain of the fact, that it is one of the elements that support vegetation, and that in the present system vegetation cannot exist without it, we may then clearly perceive intention. For vegetation cannot be an accidental effect. In the relations, therefore, which unorganized objects bear to the organized, we can perceive the intention and discern the will of the Creator.

In organized inanimate objects we can perceive intention in the organization itself, and in the relations which they bear to animate organizations. A grain of wheat possesses a germinating principle. This springs from the ground in an organized stalk, whose

organism is precisely adapted to produce the ear. Now in the organization of the stalk, we can perceive the intention of producing grains of wheat. Each new grain possesses a germinating principle, in which we perceive the further intention of perpetuating the species. In the relations also of inanimate to animate organizations, we can perceive intention. For, the animate cannot exist without the inanimate organizations.

In the relations of organized inanimate objects to each other, however, we can perceive no intention. For no one is in any manner dependent upon another. Unless, perhaps, there be intention in the relations of tendrill plants and the organized objects to which they cling, or in the relations of organized objects to parasital plants, such as the misletoe. Neither can we perceive intention in the relations which organized objects, either animate or inanimate, bear to the unorganized. For the latter are in no way dependent upon the former, but the former upon the latter.

In animate objects, we can perceive intention in the physical and mental organizations, in the relations which one species bears to another, and in the case of man in the relations of one man to another. In the physical organization of the ox, we can perceive intention in each bone and muscle, in the eye and ear, and in the teeth. And in his mental organization, if we may use the expression, we can perceive an exact adaptation of mind to pursue those habits which render him

physically and mentally happy. And so of the rest of the brute creation. But except in the relations of sex, and of parent and offspring, we can perceive no intention in the relations of one to another of the same species in the brute creation. For one cannot assist another in acquiring knowledge, or in obtaining happiness. In the relations of one species to another, however, we can frequently perceive intention. For some species are carnivorous, and cannot exist except upon animate organizations. And as the Deity has created them, the intention of supporting their lives must have entered into other species.

Now from what has been said, it must appear that, in many instances, we can clearly trace intention, *i. e.*, the adapting means to accomplish an end, from unorganized to organized objects, both animate and inanimate, from organized inanimate to animate organizations and from one species to another of animate organizations. We cannot, however, trace intention in the reverse order. But on examination, however, of an organized object, either animate or inanimate, we may frequently infer intention to have entered into some other object. For, if we clearly perceive an object to be precisely adapted to receive a given effect, and this effect to be absolutely necessary to the well-being and existence of the object, we may clearly infer that if the Creator willed its existence and well-being, He intended some object to produce this effect upon it. And it may be laid down as a general rule without exceptions,

that where an object is precisely adapted to receive a given effect, and cannot thrive or exist without it, while there are various other objects precisely adapted to produce it, some one at least of these latter objects must have been intended for that purpose. In the relation of food to animate life, we have an illustration of the rule. Nutriment must be received or life cannot exist. And further, in animate objects, when it is necessary that an effect be received, and objects to produce it can be procured only in a certain manner, we may clearly infer intention to have entered into this manner. For the manner is a necessary antecedent to a consequent, which is necessary. Keeping in view then, that where we perceive the intention we can also discern the will, we will proceed to examine man with reference to the Creator's will respecting his actions.

CHAPTER II.

INTENTION EXHIBITED IN BODY AND MIND.

MAN is composed of body and mind. And in each of these we can perceive intention, *i. e.*, the adapting means to accomplish an end. We will first examine intention in the body. And the first end which we will notice, in whose antecedents we can perceive intention, is the animate life of man.

Without inquiring into the manner the first man was brought into existence, let us see in what way animate life is brought about in our day. The infant first begins to exhibit an organization; these organs then begin to draw nourishment to themselves, and when they are sufficiently developed and nourished, they perform their several functions, and animate life follows. And as life cannot be an accidental or experimental effect, the intention exhibited in the corporeal organism shows that the Creator willed the animate life of man.

Next, the preservation of the life of each individual for a period of time. We find that in case of any harm happening the bodily organization, certain remedial secretions are formed about the injured part; and in whatever way injury may be received, whether by poison in the stomach, or by the sting of a serpent,

the body always makes an effort to free itself from the harm. And in this we may perceive the intention of preserving life. And although there be an adaptation in many things to produce harm, and even death, yet I apprehend it can be shown that they were not adapted for that purpose by the Creator. For, if they were, then it is the will of Deity that they shall produce their effects, sooner or later, upon the life of each individual.

If they produce their effects immediately upon man's coming into life, then the Creator must have willed man's existence, and at the same time prepared means for his destruction, *i. e.*, willed his non-existence, which is perfectly absurd. But if they are to take effect at a later period, then he who lives to old age and does not die by poison, has transgressed the will of Deity by doing so. I apprehend no person will believe this.

But the animate life itself, in whose antecedents we perceive intention, is a necessary antecedent to human actions, respecting which we are to inquire into the will of Deity. And to enable the human mind to produce actions either upon mind or matter, we perceive the intention in the body. In order, however, that a man may produce intentional actions, he must first have ideas. Let us therefore examine the intention in the body respecting ideas in the mind. It is well known that all our ideas of the existence of external objects are derived through the bodily senses. And

when a child comes into the world, the body immediately begins to convey ideas to the mind. From every point to which the eye is directed there flow ideas of color, shape, and configuration; every breath of air brings ideas of sound; every substance which the body touches leaves ideas of touch; everything put into the mouth adds ideas of taste; and every thing applied to the nose gives ideas of scent. And in childhood the mind must very rapidly gather ideas. For then each object possesses novelty and excites and impresses the mind. And were these bodily senses wanting, the mind could not possess any knowledge of external objects. Now this knowledge is received by the mind in its passive capacity.

Hence we can trace intention directly through the body from external objects to the ideas of them in the mind. But the human mind in itself has no power to create any new law, or to modify any law already established, but must take every thing as it finds it. Now inertia is a property of all matter, and gravitation affects each particle. Were the mind, therefore, not connected with some material mechanism, whose forces it can put into operation and direct, it could never remove a stone from its place. But without human action man cannot exist. We may, therefore, clearly trace intention from exertion in the mind through the body, and through extraneous antecedents to human actions.

Now, many human actions, which we may clearly

perceive the Creator to have intended to be accomplished, are left for man to perform. Some of these are indicated by the intention exhibited in the body. And the first we will notice is the procuring food to sustain life. We cannot doubt that the Deity intended man to procure food. For organism and nourishment to this organism are necessary antecedents to man's animate life on earth; and after a child has come into the world, the manner of receiving nourishment is changed, but it must still be received, or life cannot exist. Hence the intention in the relation of food to man must be clear. But food cannot be procured without exertion, *i. e.*, without human actions being brought about. The will of Deity must therefore be evident.

But again; in the present system of things, man cannot thrive, and it militates against his very existence to do without clothing. In many latitudes it is, perhaps, impossible for man to exist, even in a most wretched condition, without some sort of clothing and houses. But clothing and houses for man's preservation and comfort are human actions, *i. e.*, effects produced by man's exertion. We may therefore clearly infer that the Creator intended man to procure clothing, *i. e.*, intention entered into the antecedents necessary to man's health and comfort. Again, in the body we perceive the intention of perpetuating the species.

Next, of intention exhibited in the human mind. And the first intentional end which we will notice

is the knowledge of the nature of things. Knowledge of things and of their relations to man is absolutely necessary to man's existence. Could not man acquire a knowledge of some things, and of their adaptation for food, he would immediately perish; could he gain no knowledge of things adapted for his comfort, he would live wretchedly. Did he possess no knowledge of things which will harm him, he could never avoid them. But the senses without reflection teach man neither the adaption of things with which he is surrounded, nor the nature of his own constitution. And hence we should infer, that intention must have entered into some active faculties of the mind; and in the reflective faculties we find the means exactly adapted to accomplish this end. Man can learn by his own experience and reflection; and by observing one man's experience, others can learn without experience. And further, by observation and reflection, man can learn, and it is necessary that he should, that like causes, *ceteris paribus*, will always produce like effects. This implies a knowledge of principle. And the discovery of principles is the object of every science. We may therefore clearly infer that the Creator intended man to cultivate science, *i. e.*, intention entered into the faculties adapted to this end.

But again, without society, sufficient knowledge for the continuation and well-being of the human race cannot be gained. Society is, therefore, a necessary condition to man's existence and well-being, and must

have been intended by the Almighty. But unless some distinctions of right and wrong be in some degree observed among men, society cannot exist. And we find the human mind adapted to perceive, and impelled to observe moral distinctions. And our moral constitutions influence us in two directions, viz: to reverence the Creator, and to respect the rights of others. These ends, therefore, are intentional, and in their antecedents we can perceive intention.

Again, in accomplishing all the intentional ends which we perceive either in body or mind, man experiences pleasure, *i. e.*, is made happy. By eating we both preserve life and experience pleasure, *i. e.*, it is an antecedent to both these consequents. Proper intellectual exertion also is an antecedent to both discovery and happiness. By each sense we obtain ideas and receive happiness. And in the accomplishment of any intentional end of our constitution whatever, happiness also always follows the antecedents to this end. On the other hand, for the nonaccomplishment of these intentional ends, man always receives misery. If a man will not eat, he will destroy his life, one of the intentional ends of the Creator. But for his abstinence, he will receive misery while life lasts. And this is the case with the nonuse or abuse of every faculty which the Creator has given us. And this teaches us that the Creator intended every faculty to be used, and that happiness was intended for man. But there

must obviously be a manner and an amount of legitimate use of each faculty.

For, a man may eat innutritious food, or he may eat nutritious food to such an amount that he will receive injury.

Now the abuse of manner and of the amount of legitimate use of any faculty is indicated by pain in the faculty itself, or by injury to some other faculty. If we endeavor to test the smoothness of objects by the eye, we will soon experience pain in this faculty, because the manner of use is illegitimate. But all our faculties may be expanded by the legitimate use; and the desire to use them will increase with this expansion. And hence, one faculty may be made to afford happiness in a higher degree than others, and to be almost the only source of pleasure. But when this is the case we will always find, that other faculties have received a positive injury. And mostly we will experience pain in these other faculties; if not, we will always experience that unhappiness which invariably follows from their nonuse. And this teaches us that the Creator intended us to use each faculty in a legitimate manner, and only to a certain amount; and that this amount shall be such as will not interfere with the use of each of the others. And if each faculty be legitimately used to an amount sufficient to accomplish the end for which it was designed and no more, we will find the use of every faculty to be harmonious. And in this manner, each man would enjoy the great-

est amount of happiness of which his being is capable. And such evidently is the will of the Creator in man's creation. And such would really be the case in the world, were it not for the ignorance, the vices, and oppressions among men.

Reflection upon the above.—The mind is the intelligent and active principle in man. The body is an organic mechanism. And this mechanism of itself produces certain effects independent of the exertion of mind. But in this mechanism we perceive certain intentional ends indicated, which can be accomplished only by the mind's exertion. Now, every intelligent machinist looks first at the properties and laws of the materials with which his machine is to work ; and frames his machine of such materials and upon such laws as will suitably adapt it for the intended business. In making the machine he has in view certain effects ; and to produce those effects is his sole object in making the machine. And by analogy, such is the case with our Creator. Now if any man derange the work of an artist so that it cannot accomplish the ends for which it was designed, he evidently thwarts the will of its maker. But the will of Deity is law, and he who thwarts his will is guilty of a moral wrong. But further, where the Almighty has adapted the means to accomplish an end, it is evidently his will that this end should be accomplished ; and the omitting to accomplish it is a moral wrong. Hence, those

actions indicated by the exhibition of intention, in man's physical or mental constitutions are positive duties, and the omitting to accomplish them is morally wrong.

CHAPTER III.

RIGHT TO THE EARTH.

MAN has been created and placed upon the earth, and of necessity he must occupy some locality. If he offered no resistance to the encroachments of wild beasts, he would not only be driven from place to place, but must eventually be destroyed. For, no compromise can be made with beasts of prey or venomous reptiles. They must be driven from the habitations of men or be permitted to exterminate the human race. Now, in the constitution of man we perceive that progress in knowledge and virtue is a law of our nature. And man is urged to make this progress by the love of knowledge, by the desire for happiness, and by necessity. Neither has the ultimatum of human progress yet been reached, nor as yet can we have any idea of its limits. As yet, we cannot perceive any limit to the oldest science ; and new and fresh

fields are now and again opening to be explored by the human mind.

In beasts, however, we perceive no adaptation for making progress. At the present time they possess no more knowledge, but are in every respect on the same footing as they were in the earliest ages. And evidently the Creator intentionally made the constitution of things as we find them. Human progress is therefore, intentional, *i. e.*, intention entered into its antecedents ; and the prevention of this progress must be contrary to the will of Deity. We may, therefore, clearly infer that man's right to the earth is paramount.

But again, in the very early period of man's existence but little knowledge of the arts, and almost none of the sciences was possessed. The actual history of mankind exhibits progress from barbarism. And as agriculture was then but little understood, man must have subsisted upon spontaneous fruits, upon other animals, or have perished. But at the present day, the spontaneous fruits of the most favored countries would preserve the existence of but a very sparse population. And in many latitudes perhaps it is impossible for man to live entirely upon vegetable food. And we must suppose this to have been the case when man came upon the earth. And hence, at that time animal food was a necessary antecedent to man's existence. And at the present time if animal food were denied man, millions of human beings, if not the human race, must soon perish. Hence, in the relations of ani-

mal food to man, we must perceive intention. But again, the use of beasts in the work of production is one of the first steps towards civilization. And until natural agents to take their place have been discovered and made subservient, beasts must of necessity be used. Hence, from what has been said, it follows that upon earth man is the favorite, and has his Maker's will to use the earth and the things in it.

CHAPTER IV.

RIGHT OF PROPERTY.

If any man were isolated from other men, he might make his habitation where he chose, use the fruit of any tree he liked, take those animals he wanted, and cultivate the spot most convenient to himself ; and by doing so, he would be but exercising his moral rights. But, as we have seen, man's constitution exhibits the intention of living in society. And the actual history of man shows, that men not only have a natural desire for society, but cannot happily endure solitude. For those persons who have isolated themselves, have been among the most miserable of the human race. The constitution and attachment of the sexes would form little societies, parental and filial affection would bind

together more members, and fraternal sympathy would further augment the number. And all this might be brought about without any member feeling, perhaps, the need of society for the purpose of gaining that knowledge requisite to his happiness, or of obtaining protection from the attacks of beasts. Thus the natural bent of the human constitution, irrespective of benefits received, would lead men to form societies. But there are benefits to be received by living in society, which the Deity must have intended for man ; for they can be obtained in no other manner. Progress in knowledge of any kind cannot be made without society. Every succeeding generation would be on the same footing as the preceding. No distribution of labor could take place, no art could attain to any perfection ; the knowledge even of Deity, and of moral right, would be but vague imaginings ; and man's whole existence, if it could continue, would be miserable in the extreme. But man's constitution shows that the Deity intended better things. Now when men come to live in society, it is necessary to inquire into the laws of reciprocity ; for if these be not understood nor obeyed, many will not only receive no equitable benefit from society, but often will be subjected to positive injury.

We have spoken of the moral rights which every one might morally (*i. e.*, by the will of God,) enjoy in an isolated condition. They are nothing more nor less than the free use of every mental and corporeal faculty in its legitimate office, upon any object of de-

sire whatever. No law of reciprocity could be violated. And upon entering society, the only directly prohibitory modifications of natural right, which can be made upon any general rule, are the prohibiting the use of a certain faculty or faculties entirely, the limiting the amount of use of certain faculties, the prohibiting the use of certain species of objects, and the prohibiting the use of certain objects (not species of objects). Now we cannot believe the Almighty intended any man to be entirely deprived of the use of any faculty. For, He made each faculty for the express purpose of being used. Neither can society limit the amount of use of any faculty without manifestly thwarting the will of Deity. If, for instance, the quantity of food that may be eaten by each individual be prescribed, and this quantity be sufficient to satisfy the wants and consequent desires of the greatest eaters, the limitation amounts to nothing. If it do not satisfy the wants of those who require the most, the will of Deity is violated. For He made their constitutions such, that they require a greater quantity. The amount of use of any faculty therefore must be left for every individual to regulate for himself upon moral principles. Other men have nothing to do with it. But if certain species of objects be prohibited, these species are entirely excluded from every man's use. If certain objects (not species) be prohibited, these objects can be enjoyed by nobody. If either of these arrangements be according to the will of the Creator, there

must be some species of objects, or some objects, which no man has any moral right to touch. Such cannot be the condition of society intended by the Deity; hence no direct prohibition of natural right can morally, *i. e.*, by the will of God, be made by society.

The only general rule, therefore, which can morally be established by society, is the permitting each individual to freely use all his faculties upon the unused stock of objects in the world. And as two men cannot use the same object at the same time, it is necessary to inquire into the manner in which the moral right of use is distributed. Now all objects which a man may receive from nature and appropriate to his exclusive use, may be divided into two classes, *viz.*, land, with the things on it and in it, and wild animals. Let us first consider land.

If any one should pre-occupy any spot for an habitation, this spot would then be in use; and as the use can be enjoyed simultaneously but by one individual, the pre-occupier, in whom the use is already vested, must have the moral right. For, before the locality was occupied, each man's moral right to use it was equal. And by one man's occupying it, an unoccupier's right cannot certainly be made better. But the occupier has a vested right; and certainly one's vested right cannot morally (*i. e.*, by the will of Deity,) be set aside by another, whose right was but equal to the occupier's before the use became vested. And this doctrine, I believe, has been acquiesced in by all

authors, from Cicero to the present time. But it must be evident that the right of possession continues no longer than a person continues the use. If he move away, the spot again falls into the common unused stock.

But again: each individual's faculties belong to himself; and it most frequently happens that the benefit to be derived from the use of one's faculties is not immediate. The farmer who sows his wheat one fall, receives not the benefit of his labor until the harvest of the next autumn be gathered. Hence the moral right of possession must continue until the benefits of labor may be received, though the spot be not actually from day to day used by the occupant. When, however, a man has received the benefits of his labor, and moves away, he has lost his moral right by pre-occupancy, and he carries with him the fruits of his labor. The place is therefore in common again.

But again; he who brings a piece of wild land into cultivation, produces a utility inseparable from the land; and if buildings and fencing be placed upon it, these also are products produced by man's faculties. And if a man's faculties be his own, whatsoever product of utility he may create, must be his own also. And to deprive any one of products which he may create, is tantamount to depriving him of the use of his faculties. This is evidently morally wrong, *i. e.*, contrary to the will of Deity. Hence the utility created by bringing wild land into cultivation belongs to him who has

produced it, and he may morally exchange it with another individual for an equivalent, or bestow it as a free gift to a friend. And this short account seems to me to explain sufficiently the moral right of enjoying and transferring real estate.

Concerning wild animals the same principles will apply. If they be domesticated, they belong to him who has tamed them. If permitted to become wild again, they again become common stock. Such is the common law and such, I apprehend, is the moral law.

Now when things which are the immediate gift of the Creator, have been distributed among the members of society, according to the laws of reciprocity, each person may apply his physical and mental faculties to the production of utilities from the objects which he has received. These utilities, by political economists, are called products. And as each one's faculties are his own, the products of his labor are his own also, and he may morally exchange them with other individuals. In agriculture nature performs the greater part of the productive process, and the utilities are called agricultural products. In transforming iron from the ore into axes, man's ingenuity and labor have a greater part to perform, and such utilities are called manufactural products. The exchange of products constitutes commerce.

Now the manner of acquiring property above described seems to me to be the way, and the only way, by which an individual may morally, *i. e.*, by the will of

God, obtain property. The earth and the things in it were intended for man; not for one man, nor for a certain set of men, but for the human race. And it is absurd to suppose that any one man, or any set of men, should have the exclusive right to the earth, while the rest of mankind, who have the same nature, and stand in the same relations to the Creator, should have no right to any of it. Suppose a tract of land containing many thousand acres to be unoccupied, and a certain man to claim it. It is evident that a small portion of this land would be all that he himself could use, and if other men be excluded from it, the remainder must continue a waste. And if men have a moral right to claim large tracts of land, which they themselves cannot use, and exclude others from them, then one man may claim a million of acres, another a million, and so on. And by such an arrangement, a few men might have all the land in the world, and exclude the rest of mankind from the earth. That such a state of things would be contrary to the will of Deity we need not argue. But we have shown that each man has a moral right to occupy, cultivate, and exclusively own any piece of unoccupied and unused land, which he may choose for himself. And without positive institutions no man could have any thing whatever to show in favor of his owning land which he himself had not touched, and for which he had given no equivalent to another, who had previously brought it into culti-

vation. Money is a medium of exchange, and possesses a relative value. And it is for the benefit of society (for, as political economists have shown, it aids in production,) that, instead of individuals exchanging the products themselves, which each has produced, they may make use of a convenient medium of exchange.

Now if an individual by skill and industry accumulate money, has he not a moral right to give this as an equivalent for vacant lands? that he has a moral right to make an exchange for property which another individual owns, we do not doubt.

But no one individual more than another has any moral right to land which is in common. No such exchange, therefore, can take place between individuals. The exchange, however, in the present state of political arrangements takes place between individuals and governments. And in order that any set of men may convey a right to others, they must possess this right in *properis personis*, or as agents convey the right of a principal. Now if monarchs, oligarchs, or senates, claim vacant territories for their own exclusive benefit, after what has been said, we need not adduce argument to show that it is an unrighteous usurpation. But if government be the agent, society must be the principal. In society, however, the moral right to possess the unused earth is distributed equally among the members; and no positive institution which men may set up can morally (*i. e.*, by the will of God,)

take upon itself the agency of any right belonging to an individual, without such individual's consent.

But it may be said, that in the present state of morals an equitable government is a great benefit to mankind; and in order to enjoy this benefit, it is necessary that each individual should surrender, not only some of his natural rights, *i. e.*, rights which he might enjoy in an isolated condition, but also some rights which he might morally enjoy in a society without government in strict obedience to the laws of reciprocity. All this we admit; and we admit that governments may morally have the supervision of vacant territories, and protect those who go to occupy them from the attacks of savages and marauding bands; and see that among the occupants the laws of reciprocity be obeyed. And for such service the individuals are justly called upon to surrender an equitable portion of their goods as a recompense. But is it necessary to the existence of good government that each individual should surrender the right, which God has given him, of taking from the common stock, with strict regard to the rights of others, and subject himself to the hardship of buying it back again? We believe it cannot be shown to be so. Does this arrangement best promote the welfare of mankind? So far from its doing this, on the contrary we will endeavor to show that it is the source of the greatest evils to society. Now, there are but two inducements for an individual to invest money in wild agricultural lands,

which he himself cannot use. He either buys to sell again, or to let out to tenants. If he buy to sell again, he expects to sell at an advanced price. And if unimproved land advance in value, it is because society needs more land to be cultivated ; and if these lands be kept a waste, society is injured to the full amount of the value of the products which might be produced from them. If, however, they be sold at an advance to agriculturists, all this purchase-money must be paid by the farmer for the privilege of exercising those rights which he might have freely enjoyed per *jus Dei*, had not government put this hardship upon him. This is the penalty for surrendering this natural and moral right into the hands of an agent making such arrangements. It is a moral wrong and an injustice to the tillers of the soil. And had this purchase money been left in the hands of the farmer to be converted into fixed capital, the productiveness of his farm would have been greatly increased, and so far would he be the happier, and society in general be benefited. To be deprived of this productiveness is an injury to mankind. But, if an individual buy to let out to tenants, these tenants must be unable to procure land for themselves so near to any market that they may employ their labor with any personal profit. For no one would pay rent for wild land under any feeling of moral obligation without compulsion, for such land possesses no utility whatever, except that which nature offers. Hence such tenancy is a coerced con-

dition of the farmer, resulting either from the too limited territory of a state, or from land monopoly. But providing there be unmonopolized territory on the frontier of a country, the tillers of the soil then have the alternative of becoming tenants, or of moving into a sparsely settled wilderness. In the latter event, they are deprived most generally of markets for their products, of profitable social intercourse, of suitable medical aid, and of schools for their children, and very often subjected to the demon cruelties of the relentless savage. All this is an injury to them. And if their children grow up in ignorance, in a representative government, this is a political evil. And further, in a state possessing a large territory, if the lands in and around the borders of the *foci* of society be monopolized, and emigration, to any great extent, takes place to lands unclaimed by deedal parchments, such a movement has a direct tendency to scatter the population of a country, to make men seek for themselves a wild independence, and to produce weakness in the government ; conditions of society most unfavorable to a high order of civilization. This is an injury to the whole nation.

But suppose all the lands in a country to be monopolized. By the nature of things, if the capitalists in manufacture lower the wages of their employees, they will endeavor to obtain employment in commerce, in the professions, and in agriculture. And as land is monopolized, the number of employers remains the same, while the number of those offering themselves

as employees in these latter branches of industry, is increased. The wages in all branches of industry, therefore, will fall. And as the man who does not possess capital of his own to which he may apply his industry, must earn wages from an employer in order to live, capitalists may reduce the wages of labor to that point which will merely keep the employees alive, and enable them to rear families sufficiently large to keep up a supply of laborers. Such alas, is the actual state of things in Europe at the present time. The feudal system of land tenure commenced in monopoly, and still preserves its monopolizing character, though variously modified by different States. And the result in most States of the old world is the entire subversion of civil liberty, and the subjugation of man. And if in these States men cannot effect a change in favor of their natural and moral rights, nor emigrate to countries unblighted by monopoly, they must ever remain in this hopeless condition. In the United States, we have abolished the feudal laws of entailment. And as our territories are too large to be monopolized by speculators as yet, death distributes in parcels the estates of monopolists to men of moderate means;—and unclaimed virgin soil may still be obtained from government at moderate prices.

These causes as yet prevent the control of labor to a great extent. They do not, however, free us from the evils resulting from the present system of land monopoly. And we Americans too, with the groans

of Europe in our ears, are hastening on to bend the servile knee and do the menial service of capitalists. From the present system of acquiring property, we may trace a base disregard of duty in legislative halls, a corrupt adjudication of law in judicial functionaries, and a higher estimate set upon cunning and device than upon skill and integrity; things incompatible with the stability of a republic, and destructive to the rights of man. And we might go on almost *ad infinitum*, and show evils brought upon humanity by changing the natural order of things which God established for man, and erecting in its stead artificial arrangements invented by feudal despots, or even dictated by the most enlightened, yet short-sighted intellects of sincere patriots.

But it may be said, that if this natural order of things spoken of were adopted, industrious men would be deprived of one of the most secure investments for their accumulations, and so far they would be deprived of liberty. That they would be deprived of the liberty of doing as they please is evident. But "civil liberty is natural liberty so far restrained and no farther than is necessary for the good of society." And to do as one may please is inconsistent with civil liberty. And in the natural state, without government, no such investments could be made. To be deprived therefore, of the privilege of investing in lands which are in common, is neither an infringement of civil nor of natural liberty. But it cannot be denied, that to

prevent individuals from occupying and owning what their industry may reclaim from nature, is a direct infringement of natural liberty at least.

But it may be said, that it would at least be a hardship. If it be even so, the hardships which men would be made to endure from the natural order of things, would not approximate in any degree to the hardships which they are made to undergo by the artificial arrangements. But, I apprehend, we will perceive on further investigation, that the hardship feared is purely imaginary, and that a real benefit would accrue to capitalists themselves as well as to all other classes of society, were things left to flow in their natural channel. It will be said, that if the natural manner of obtaining property were established, capital would be restricted, the accumulations of industry would not be of equal value to the possessors, capitalists not being able to employ their capital to advantage would flee to more congenial climes, the stimulus to industry would be taken away, the whole capital of the nation would decline, manufacture and commerce would go down, the nation would become poor, and wretchedness and barbarism would follow. We will endeavor to show these to be entirely imaginary evils, and that a movement in a directly opposite direction would take place from the very nature of things. Now, it will be evident to every one having but a superficial knowledge of political economy, that the sale of public lands to individual citizens by the government,

does not at all add anything to the wealth of the nation. There is but a transfer of value from the hands of individuals to the public treasury. The whole amount of values in the nation remains exactly the same. While these lands remain uncultivated in the possession of speculators, they are unproductive capital yielding no item of national wealth. When they are resold to agriculturists at an advanced price, the speculator gains, but the national wealth is not augmented one farthing. And were all the capital of a country abstracted from productive channels, and invested in uncultivated lands, the nation would immediately starve. From which, it will be easily seen, that instead of men's investing and holding uncultivated lands tending to benefit a country in a pecuniary view, it has a direct tendency to impoverish a nation. Now, if the capital which flows into unproductive lands were precluded from this channel, and it should even leave the country without a return, the country it is true, would lose this amount of capital, but the national revenue would be decreased only to the amount of the deficit in the necessary expenses of the government, which deficit would have been supplied by the annual receipts from the land office. The amount of such deficit must be made up by products from the productive channels, and cannot be exported for a return. But unless the productive channels of other countries offer greater inducements, there is no

danger of its leaving this. And if they do, capital will flow thither at all events.

Hence, we see that the nature of things would direct the accumulations of men into productive channels, instead of channels not only unproductive of national wealth, but which cramp production. This would increase the national wealth, and the capitalists along with all classes would share in the benefit.

But it may be said, that the natural order of things would set each one to work on his own capital, the complete division of labor to form constituent parts of a whole result could not take place, and consequently we would lose the benefit derived from the great productiveness caused by such division. Now in every branch of industry which does not admit of a division of labor, there would be no loss, but a positive gain by each one laboring upon capital of his own. For in this manner, each one would produce the most. And in those branches which admit this division in but a moderate degree, it is not difficult to see that men would form partnerships, and each partner take that division best adapted to himself. And as each division would then be plied by persons immediately interested in the general result, these would be the most favorable circumstances possible for production.

But it may be said, that there would soon be no persons at all to be hired at equitable wages. This would not at all follow. For, every person who should undertake to reclaim land and cultivate it,

must have some capital before he can do any thing. And if men received a full compensation for their skill and industry from an employer, no man would undertake business for himself unless he had sufficient capital to carry it on with the greatest advantage. Hence, every man before becoming a farmer on his own account, would obtain all the fixed capital to carry on the business in the greatest perfection. This would add greatly to the national wealth.

But it may be said that under the natural arrangement, individuals would reclaim lands from the wild state, sell to others, reclaim again and again sell, and so on. This no doubt would take place, not, however, with harm but with benefit, until the profits of labor in agriculture were in exact equilibrium with the profits of labor in each other branch of industry. And this equilibrium would not be brought about until the capitalists in manufacture and commerce received the due benefits from their capital; the employees the due rewards of their skill and labor; the professional man an equitable remuneration for his learning and services; and the agriculturist the just relative value for his products. "A consummation devoutly to be wished," and that state of society into which, I apprehend, the Creator intended man to come. In a society like this, the frontier would be immediately on the borders of refinement, the population would be condensed by free will and natural tendency; integrity would be esteemed and sought after in every depart-

ment; each one's peculiar talents would take that channel adapted to themselves, for there they would be sure to gain their rewards; the inducements to virtue would be stronger than those to vice; wealth would increase, and happiness be found in every dwelling. In such a society, we would not of course perceive that great poverty of industrious individuals, which some have supposed necessary to civilization and to the advancement of national wealth; a supposition borrowing the appearance of truth from the actual condition of the civilized world, but which is as unphilosophical as it is derogatory of the beneficent Creator. The equality of talent and of individual wealth is no doubt but a dream. But that each individual may be permitted to secure for himself the full deserts of his skill and industry, we believe to be highly practical, in conformity to the will of Deity, and for the best interest of mankind.

CHAPTER V.

MARRIAGE.

SEXUAL love is common to the human race, and there are but four possible ways of arranging it, viz., by polygamy, by polyandry, by the free love system—*meretricium*—and by the marriage of one man to one woman.

Now it is a fact that the number of births of each sex, and the number of each sex becoming adults in each generation, are substantially equal. That there may be slight variations from this equality in certain generations may naturally be supposed. But that no variation upon any general law of nature takes place is evident. For if there did, by observing two or three generations a considerable inequality would be perceived. And when population had increased upon the earth to many millions, an enormous inequality would be apparent in each generation. And by observing a single State, if in one generation the equality be destroyed by the ravages of disease upon females, or by the havoc of war upon males, the next generation brings along with it the equality of the sexes again. But if it be said that the general law of nature does not produce an equality of number of sexes, but that in a particular state the equality may be kept up by

the emigration of that sex, which is produced in excess, this assertion must appear groundless. For let us suppose by the law of nature the number of males in each generation to be the greater; if the equality in a particular state be kept up by emigration, it must be evident, that this emigration must flow to a state where disease or war had destroyed the excess of males, otherwise the inequality in the latter state would be greatly increased. But observation on states at peace shows that when an inequality caused by immigration exists in one state, an inequality of an opposite character always exists in the states from which the emigration proceeded. Hence it must be evident that the equality of number of sexes is the law of nature. Now if polygamy or polyandry were universally adopted, (and physiology favors the one as much as the other, and both have been practiced,) then many persons would have to lead a life of celibacy by compulsion; a mode of life which the Creator clearly did not intend for man, and which is excusable only under compulsive circumstances.

But again, we must suppose that the Creator made all things perfect, for the well-being of the human race; and as the number of sexes is equal, the happiness of a certain number of males must be consistent with that of a like number of females. Hence nothing could be gained on either hand by the free love system, which might not be enjoyed by judicious marriages. If we add to this the fact that the free love

system renders the female degraded, and extinguishes that self-respect and highmindedness in man himself; while in marriage woman is respected and loved, man is proud of his and her position, sacrifices on either hand are readily made for each other's happiness, and children are loved, and in return love their parents, we cannot doubt that marriage was intended by the Creator.

All authors of any merit are agreed upon this subject, and we need not pursue it further. It is not, however, surprising that polygamy and free love should be advocated and practiced even in this enlightened age, and in our own country of general intelligence. For it is common with men to mark the evils which flow from the abuse of a system, and regard them as the legitimate results of the system itself. And at the present day marriages are conducted most frequently upon principles of traffic, in which fortunate boors and simpering misers hold the best stands; an abuse induced by the general avarice, and consequent neglect of right, which have come upon our country.

CHAPTER VI.

GOVERNMENT.

WE have seen that each individual has certain rights given to him by the Creator, and that the Deity intended men to live in society. And as the Creator intended each individual to enjoy certain rightful privileges, He must be consistent with himself, and could not have intended any thing to deprive an individual of the rights granted. Hence if anything hinder an individual from enjoying his rights, such hindrance must be contrary to the will of Deity, and the person has a moral right to remove it. Thus the Deity evidently intended a man with eyes to see, and hence a person not only has a moral right, but is morally bound to prevent, if in his power, any thing from putting out his eyes. And if men have a right to remove impediments to the enjoyment of their rights, they must have the moral right to use those means necessary for this purpose. But suppose an opposition to preclude a person from his rights, and there be two methods of removing it; by the one, other persons will be deprived of rights which the Creator originally intended for them, while by the other the will of Deity would be in no manner thwarted. Here it is evident that the latter method, which will permit all the intentions of Providence to take effect, ought morally

to be adopted. But suppose an opposition to arise, and there be but one method of removing it, and by this method certain individuals will necessarily be deprived of rights which were originally intended for them, what ought to be done? If the opposition be brought about by inanimate nature, or by beasts, the individual himself ought to bear the deprivation. For it would be unjust to free one man from misfortune by putting it on another. If, however, the opposition be offered by man, I apprehend the case is different; and those who endeavor to deprive an individual of his rights, ought rather to be deprived of rights which the Creator originally intended for them, than be permitted to inflict an injury upon an inoffensive person.

Now, in society, each individual morally possesses certain rights, which are either morally absolute, (*i. e.*, cannot be lost by the individual in any manner,) or conditional (*i. e.*, by the will of Deity become extinguished by certain acts of the individual himself). Now man's very existence on earth is conditional. If he endeavor to live on arsenic, he will cease to exist. His existence, his happiness, and his rights, are all conditional; they depend upon the laws which the Creator has established, *i. e.*, upon the will of Deity. And if an individual violate any law of the Creator, he must lose the rights which depend upon that law. In society, each individual is morally bound to obey

the laws of reciprocity. If a man violate them he loses the rights depending thereon, and the society can not do wrong by taking them from him. And hence it is evident that a society has a moral right to make arrangements for protecting the rights of each individual.

Now it will be evident to every one on the slightest reflection, that if all mankind would obey the laws of reciprocity, governments would not only be unnecessary, but gratuitous burdens. And if we should consider the injuries done to production by governments, the cruelties inflicted upon home subjects and foreign foes, and the dearest rights of man crushed, we should be almost led to believe that mankind would not suffer more in a state of anarchy. But if we reflect upon the ambitions, the prejudices, the animosities, and cruel dispositions of men of the same and of different societies, and consider the state of things these will bring about in anarchy, we will readily admit that mankind can not approximate to virtue and happiness without governments. General utility is, therefore, the object to be aimed at in forming a government. And if we regard a society internally, without reference to other societies, I apprehend that universal utility will always correspond to moral right. And viewing each civil-society as a moral person, and a member of the society of nations, a utility which is universal in this society, must also correspond with moral right.

Now the purposes for which governments may morally be created are three, viz., to protect a society from the aggressive injuries of other societies, to secure to each individual in the society the rights which the Creator has given him; and to carry into effect any moral measure which will be of general utility.

And a government thus established has a moral right to use those means necessary to accomplish these purposes. Unfortunately for man, the same vices which governments are intended to suppress, creep into the government itself, and direct its forces to illegitimate ends. Now as each individual in society must be engaged in some occupation of his own, every member cannot act as a governmental functionary. And hence it is necessary that certain offices be established, and their duties and powers particularly specified; and also that certain individuals be appointed to fill these offices. These officers must, of course, receive a remuneration for their services; and to accomplish the objects for which the offices are created requires means. These things constitute the expenses of government, and they must be furnished by the society. Hence, to form a government, each individual must surrender a ratio of his property to society; each individual must also surrender to society the right of self-protection, so far as society is able to protect him; reserving to himself the right of self-defence in cases where society's agents cannot know his distress and be present to protect him; each in-

dividual must surrender to society the right to settle disputes between individuals, and to redress wrongs; and each individual must surrender to society the right to make laws for the government of every member. The remaining natural rights of each individual remain with himself, and if they be taken away it is tyranny.


CONCLUDING REMARKS.

WE will conclude our outline here. Morality is a subject as broad as the actions which man can perform. No writer could investigate all the circumstances under which human actions may be produced. Such a work could not be read if it were written. And we are of the opinion that cursory reading will not be sufficient to convince the mind of the truths set forth in the principles of moral science. Moral science must be studied carefully and diligently. And we are aware that none but the laborious student are willing to investigate thoroughly a large volume. And even he will become fatigued by prolix discussions, and either let an author carry him along at his will, without thinking for himself, or lay the volume quietly upon the shelf. We have, therefore, been as pointed

and concise as possible, breaking the shell of each subject treated of, as soon as we were able, putting the reader in possession of the substance of the matter, and leaving him, if convinced of the principles disclosed, to carry those principles farther for himself. Books may stimulate thought and set men on the right road to think correctly. Each individual, however, must think for himself, or he will have no fixed principles of any kind. Paley, Wayland, Alexander, Smith, Hume, Dimond, Abercrombie and various other authors may be consulted by any person who may desire to learn all that able men have said upon the subject. And we apprehend, that such a course of reading will satisfy any one that he must think for himself. Many intelligent business men in our country have concluded that moral science needs all the reputation of a distinguished author, as its truths are mainly supported by authority.

A science, if thoroughly studied, will convince the mind of its truths, without the name of a Newton or a LaPlace. And we believe that moral science is not a dream, nor but an ingenious display of argumentation. If authors disagree on many points, it is nothing more than has taken place in the progress of every other science. And were the disagreement of authors a proof of the futility of any thing, no science could have made its way to be received as true by mankind. We believe that no science is better calculated to improve the mental faculties, and elevate the

character and conditions of men than this. It is not mere theory. It throws light into the practical walks of life. In a pecuniary point of view, it goes hand in hand with political economy to establish the wealth and happiness of a nation. Without intelligence and industry, a nation will dwindle into abject poverty and insignificance on the most favored soil and under the most salubrious clime. Without integrity and virtue, wealth is but a curse, and a nation groans in misery, though the earth produce without labor, and its coffers be filled with gold and silver. In a republic everything relating to government depends upon the intelligence and virtue of the people. If private virtue and integrity be stifled by the cunning and unprincipled, what can we expect but the most outrageous corruption and oppression by the government. Under such circumstances, the natural ties which bind men together are severed, and each man possessing a little authority becomes a little tyrant, and teaches "bloody instructions, which being taught return to plague the inventor," and the nation falls loaded with all the miseries which humanity can suffer. After studying what we have written, think for yourself.



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Respectfully,

PETER COOPER.

We fully concur in the above statement:

DANIEL F. TIEMANN.
WILSON G. HUNT.

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
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